"I came, I saw, I conquered."

In this simple yet unforgettable quote, the life of Julius Caesar and the empire he would come to exemplify are summed up in words of total confidence and dominance. Caesar's military mentality is immortalized for the rationality and brilliancy he applied to all spheres of life. When one thinks of the conquests of Caesar and the Roman army, romantic images spring to mind of gallant daylong conflicts with epic heroics, epitomizing the ideals Rome is remembered for today.
Yet the romantic ideals we hold of combat decided by the courageous actions of Caesar or soldier alike do a disservice to Caesar's true genius, which allowed, if not guaranteed, much of the battle to be decided before the it even commenced. With an Alexander-like understanding of the importance of basic necessities, Caesar carefully planned out how to provide for his troops. Thus, he minimized desertion and casualties while maintaining order, loyalty, and morale – all significant factors to the fighting ability of an army. This understanding carried over to tactics against his adversaries. Realizing the deleterious effect that food and water deprivation would have on his enemies’ morale, condition, and psyche, Caesar made his enemies' life a living hell. The impact of a well-fed and well-trained Roman army confronting a disoriented enemy made for a situation in which only the most extraordinary shocks could affect the outcome.
Caesar was a man whose intelligence was not only limited to the scope of the battlefield. He was a master of an art of war that achieved success for the Roman Empire under circumstances that would have crushed others. His clever conduct within the framework of “traditional” Roman warfare let him return to Rome with the prestige of battles fought and won while still risking little on the actual battlefield. The legions of Rome were forever stretched out thin, and it was imperative that Caesar minimize his loses in head-to-head conflict. By pursuing strategies such as sieges to starve out or deprive the enemy of water, he forced the enemy to come to terms with Rome before battles and/or time depleted Roman ranks. The Roman public appreciated the succinctness of Caesar's wars, his tactics winning him many political and military supporters in the process. Much of Caesar's rise as general and politician can be credited to his dedication to sound battle plans and his understanding of logistics.
Logistics is formally defined as
“1. The aspect of military operations that deals with the procurement, distribution, maintenance, and replacement of materiel and personnel.
2. The management of the details of an operation.”
The wars of antiquity were not the clean-cut wars waged today. Supply routes broke down. Communication lines were slow and often ineffective; and shelter was a temporary, meager protection against the elements. Disease ravaged military camps For large armies, a constant food supply was rare, and fresh water had to be found on a daily basis. Survival was a day-to-day struggle even without the possibility of being struck through the head with a spear. Wars were exceptionally muddled affairs that made life almost as difficult off of the battlefield as on, and the life-threatening situations the soldiers constantly faced invariably led to low morale and increased desertion rates. The commander and soldier, though in control of their destinies on the front line, were equally slaves to the logistics of being part of a large, unwieldy army off of it. As commander, it was Caesar's job to minimize these impediments, and to put the best army he could on the battlefield through the wise manipulation of logistics.
The incursions into Gaul provided the greatest canvas for Caesar to display himself as a man of numbers. The first conflict in Gaul began in 58 B.C when the Helvetii tribe asked for passage through Roman territory in southern France (Warry 160). Though the Romans were at times diplomatic with the tribes of Germany and the east, the Helvetii, an aggressive tribe, had previously inflicted an embarrassing defeat on the Romans. Though he already had concluded not to allow passage, Caesar told an envoy of the tribe’s aristocrats that a decision would be reached within two weeks. The ploy allowed Caesar to begin war preparations while keeping the Helvetii at bay (Caesar 6). He utilized this time to summon a contingency of forces from local allies, supplement these auxiliaries with German cavalry, and to call upon more legions from Italy.
Caesar had his soldiers build new defense works to protect “important and completely unprotected corn-producing areas” (Caesar 8). Indeed, corn (wheat) supplies would factor into everyday strategy for the Roman general. Since the army was in a hostile area and the loyalty and dependability of local Gallic allies was questionable, military planning required careful planning for the procurement of food rations.. Local allies often stopped giving relief as the first sign of a changing allegiance. Thus Caesar and his captains often found themselves challenged consistently to put meals on soldiers’ plates. This first conflict proved so short, however, there was not time for logistical problems to surface
In fact, the first and only combat in the war with the Helvetii occurred when the commanders of the Helvetii mistook a maneuver by Caesar to attain provisions from the wheat-rich settlement of Bibracte as a retreat (Caesar 15 16). Believing they could rout the ‘fleeing army’ while cutting off the Romans' wheat supply, the Helvetii attacked the army's rearguard (Caesar 17). The Romans quickly repelled the attack and forced back the Helvetii without their baggage lines and all of their supplies. For the Helvetii the loss of supplies was devastating. Caesar commanded the surrounding local allies not to provide the Helvetii with any food or equipment or they would share a similar fate (Warry 160). As Caesar notes, the Helvetii “were compelled by their total lack of provisions to send envoys to Caesar to discuss surrender” (17). Famine-stricken, the Helvetii had no choice but to accept Caesar's surrender conditions and settle behind the Swiss Alps. The battle, in one fell swoop, had decided the war—not through loss of men, but through loss of materials. The brevity of the war against the Helvetii can be credited to Caesar’s ability to preserve his army's supply lines while completely cutting off those of the enemy.
Caesar's swift handling of the Helvetii threat allowed him to flex his military genius, but the true test lay in wait with the original tribes of Gaul. The pacification of Gaul had never truly been complete; and in 52 B.C., Vercingetorix led an uprising that began with the slaughter of Roman businessmen in Cenabum (Warry 165). Caesar quickly returned to Gaul and ordered reinforcements from Italy for his campaign in the heart of Gaul (Caesar 147). The war formally started when Caesar besieged the town of Vallaunodonum for supplies and captured over six hundred horses when the town surrendered (Caesar 149). After several humiliating defeats including Vallaunodonum, Vercingetorix convinced the Gauls to pursue what amounted to a scorched-earth policy (Warry 166). Caesar himself acknowledged that the Galls had learned from his campaign against the Helvetii: the Gaul council realized it was too impractical to conduct “normal” warfare against the Romans (Caesar 151). It is a testament to Caesar's military acumen that his enemies shaped his old strategies into their new battle plans. Their goal now became to “concentrate their efforts on cutting the Romans off from food and supplies, by every means possible” (Caesar 151).
Vercingetorix, however, was not able immediately to implement this plan. Instead, Vercingetorix defended the city of Avaricum and when plans failed to halt the Roman siege, the council decided to flee the city under cover of darkness. This plot failed when the wives being left behind cried out to the Romans that their husbands were leaving them behind, and the Gauls were forced into a hasty retreat (Caesar 158). Avaricum was a serious loss since the city remained intact and permitted Caesar to equip his army; and, as he states, “gave the army a chance to recover from the exertions and shortages it had suffered” (161). The victory also gave him the time to meet with the Aedui, a tribe who agreed to terms and sent ten thousand men to protect the corn supply (though they would eventually betray the Romans) (Caesar 162).
Following this victory, the Romans suffered a setback at Gergovia when his troops mistook what they saw as quick victory to attack the penetrated city, resulting in heavy loses for the legion (Warry 167). Coupled with the capture and subsequent burning of Bibcrate, the main warehouse for Roman wheat, the hopes for a swift and unproblematic suppression were dashed (Caesar 174). After crossing the Loire and capturing a “plentiful supply” of corn and cattle, the march began to Senones (Caesar 175). While Vercingetorix worked to get other tribes to join in the uprising, Caesar convinced his subdued allies of Germany to send light troops (Caesar 179). These arrived in due time to counter the increase in cavalry new allies brought to the Gallic forces.
The stage was set for a final confrontation. After a daylong skirmish in what basically amounted to a show of arms, Vercingetorix retired to the defenses of the city of Alesia (Warry 167). After a failed cavalry attack on the Romans, Vercingetorix developed a plan to send all of his cavalry to their respective tribes and muster troops and supplies (Caesar 183). The corn supply in Alesia could only last thirty days for his force of over eighty thousand men (Caesar 183). Building siege equipment within his lines while keeping a strong force outside of his lines to repel relief forces, the encirclement of Alesia formed a double circumvallation (Warry 168). The relief forces totaled over two hundred thousand, but their inability to come in a quick and orderly fashion or break the Roman siege spelled the doom of a united Gaul. The supply of corn dwindled to nothing, and a last ditch effort was made to escape the town during the night by simultaneous attacks by relief and concentrated forces in Alesia. The attack failed. Vercingetorix and the Gauls had to lay down their arms. By denying Vercingetorix relief forces and the food supplies he desperately needed, Caesar forced the Gauls had to follow an aggressive strategy they had not intended on using. Indeed, the climatic downfall of the revolt of Gaul can be credited to the anti-climatic strategy of logistics pursued by Caesar. As Plutarch says of Caesar, Alesia “gave him an opportunity of showing greater instances of his valor and conduct than any other contest had done” (1).
An empire rises because it can minimize the weaknesses that prevented it from being an empire in the first place. For over three centuries the Roman tribe, basically barbaric in nature and hindered by an inconsistent birth rate, survived by relying on a strong military tradition. A semi-Hellenistic influenced change occurred in the Empire, with Julius Caesar as an important stepping-stone. Though Caesar does not make an explicit reference to Alexander's influence, his outlook and mode of thinking bear many similarities to the Greek way of thinking. Caesar was as dedicated to fame and greed as any previous politician or military commander; but his desire to prove himself never overwhelmed his ability to fight rationally. In a world where cooler heads prevail, Caesar's attitude and philosophy allowed him to be a diplomat, a clear-thinking individual, and an intellectual. These qualities complemented and enhanced, rather than hindered, his abilities as a general. Though one may question Caesar's motives and intentions, we cannot doubt his talent. His actions in Gaul prove his abilities and the Empire’s increasing capacity to expand and adapt on its own, foreshadowing centuries of triumph.
Julius Caesar rewrote the book on how Romans expected war to be conducted. Previous generations bore generals who chased around enemies even in the most unfavorable circumstances. Instead of relying on 'honorable' but irrational and wasteful tactics to 'prove' Roman greatness, Caesar concentrated on the logistics of warfare. His strategy allowed Rome to preserve its troops, rather than using them as human fodder, and to minimize the loss of men and supplies even while aggrandizing his own greatness. When soldiers under Caesar's command went into battle, they knew they had a good chance of winning and surviving, a far greater encouragement to fighting fiercely than a sense of inevitable doom. Caesar revitalized the art of war, which had enabled Alexander to conquer half the known world and Caesar to do much the same. The effectiveness, efficiency, and brilliance of Julius Caesar as a general extended Roman civilization to borders once unseen and spurred his rise as a politician whose power went unmatched in seven hundred years of the Roman Empire.

Cited Sources

Caesar, Julius. The Gallic Wars. Oxford University Press, 1996.
Plutarch. The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans. Translated by John Dryden and Revised by Arthur Hugh Clough. New York: The Modern Library, [ND].
Warry, John. Warfare in the Classical World. University of Oklahoma Press, 1995.